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INTERNATIONAL LAW-The Interaction of the Hickenlooper Amendment and Bernstein Exception With the Act
of State Doctrine.
On July 8, 1958, First National City Bank of New York1 made a
fifteen million dollar loan to a Cuban government corporate agency,
Banco de Desarrollo Economico y Social, which was secured by United
States government bonds and obligations of the International Bank of
Reconstruction. The loan was renewed in 1959, and when the Banco
de Desarrollo Economico y Social was dissolved after Castro came to
power in Cuba, Banco Nacional de Cuba succeeded to the obligations.
The government of Cuba guaranteed repayment on the loan. On July
7, 1960, the loan was again renegotiated and Banco Nacional paid off
five million dollars of the obligation; collateral securing that part of
the obligation was released. The demand for payment for the remaining ten million was deferred for one year.
On September 16, 1960, First National City's eleven branches in
Cuba were seized. This seizure was based on Cuban Law No. 851 of
July 6, 1960, and implemented by Executive Power Resolution No.
2.2 As a consequence of this seizure, and although Banco Nacional
was not in default, on September 28, 1960, First National City sold the
1. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of N.Y., 270 F. Supp.
1004 (1967).
2. Executive Power Resolution No. 2. (Set out in relevant part).
Whereas: Law No. 851 of July 6, 1960, published in the Gaceta Oficial of
July 7, authorized the undersigned to order jointly, whenever they consider it
necessary to the defense of the national interest, the nationalization, by
means of expropriation, of assets and companies owned by natural or juristic
persons who are nationals of the United States of America ...
Whereas: It is not possible to allow a large share of the nation's banking to
remain in the hands of the imperialist interests which, in an act of cowardly
and criminal aggression, inspired the reduction of our sugar quota ...
Whereas: One of the most efficient instruments of that imperialistic interference in our historical development has been typified by the operations of the
American commercial banks ...
Whereas: We the undersigned realize that we should exercise the authority
vested in us, and that we should proceed, in responsible discharge of the revolutionary duty, to nationalize all the American banks operating in our country,
thus advancing still further on the road undertaken by our people, with firm
patriotic will, toward the total economic independence of our nation.
WE RESOLVE:
First: To order the nationalization, by expropriation, and consequently, award
to the Cuban Government, in absolute ownership, all the assets, rights and
shares deriving from the utilization thereof, specially the banks, including all

1972

Case Comments

collateral securing Banco Nacional's ten million dollar loan. It received
an excess of more than $1,800,000 over the value of the loan.' Banco
Nacional then brought suit to recover the excess realized from the sale
of the collateral,4 and First National City set up the confiscation of its
Cuban property as the basis for a counter-claim. Banco Nacional relied on sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine as defenses to
the counter-claim.
The district court5 held that First National City was entitled to keep
the excess realized on the sale of the collateral. This ruling was based
on two findings. The first finding was that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was not applicable to counter-claims not exceeding the
amount claimed by the plaintiff. 6 The second finding was that the
expropriation of First National City's Cuban property was in violation
of international law because it was retaliatory, discriminatory and made
provisions for only illusory compensation, the Hickenlooper Amendment was controlling, and, therefore, the act of state doctrine did not
apply to foreclose inquiry into the validity of the Cuban expropriation.
The court of appeals7 reversed. It held that the Hickenlooper
Amendment applied only to cases where the actual property expropriated or proceeds of its sale had come into the United States and was the
subject of the suit. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino' was controlling, and the court
would apply the act of state doctrine and refuse to look into the validity
of Cuba's confiscation of First National City's property in Cuba.
their branches and agencies located in Cuba, which are the property of the following legal persons:
I. The First National City Bank of New York.
Second: Accordingly, the Cuban State is hereby declared subrogated in the
place and stead of the natural or juristic persons listed in the proceeding
paragraph with respect to the above mentioned property, rights, and rights
of action, and to the assets and liabilities forming the capital of the above
mentioned companies.
3. The exact amount was not determined, but was stipulated for purposes of appeal
at $1,810, 880.51. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York,
431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
4. Originally there were two counts in the suit brought by Banco Nacional, one for
the excess realized by the First National City Bank on the sale of the collateral and the
other for the accounts maintained by a number of Cuban banks, nationalized pursuant
to Law 891, with First National City Bank at its New York office. It was decided by the
district court that the Cuban act of state, which was contrary to the public policy of
the United States, would not be given extraterritorial effect. Title to property in the
United States at the date of the expropriation did not vest in the government of Cuba.
Banco Nacional abandoned this claim in its appeal. 431 F.2d 394.
5. 270 F. Supp. 1004 (1967).
6. See National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356
(1955), for a discussion of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
7. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
8. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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The Supreme Court9 granted certiorari and remanded, without
opinion, to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the views
expressed in a letter received from the Department of State.1 °
On remand, the court of appeals1" again rendered its decision in
favor of the plaintiff, Banco Nacional."2 The court held that the Bernstein exception, which relieves the court from applying the act of state
doctrine when the Executive has indicated that its application is not
in the national interest, was to be narrowly construed. Furthermore,
the rule in Sabatino, requiring application of the act state doctrine, was
still controlling.
The judicial rule concerning the application of the act of state
9. 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
10. The letter from John R. Stevenson, a legal advisor for the Department of State,
November, 17, 1970, to the Supreme Court read in part as follows:
The Executive's role in suggesting that the act of state doctrine should not be
applied with respect to certain cases or class of cases has been recognized both
by the Department of State and in court decisions. This role, the so-called
Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine as applied by United States
courts was first clearly established in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche, Etc ...
While the Department of State in the past has generally supported the applicability of the act of state doctrine, it has never argued or implied that there
should be no exceptions to the doctrine. In its Sabbatino brief . . . it assumed
that judicial consideration of an act of state would be permissible when the
Executive so indicated ...
Recent events, in our view, make appropriate a determination by the Department of State that the act of state doctrine need not be applied when it is
raised to bar adjudication of a counter-claim or setoff when (a) the foreign
state's claim arises from a relationship between the parties existing when the
act of state occurred; (b) the amount of the relief to be granted is limited to the
amount of the foreign state's claim; (c) the foreign policy interests of the
United States do not require application of the doctrine ...
The basic considerations of fairness and equity suggesting that the act of
state doctrine not be applied in this class of cases . . . were reflected in National City Bank [of New York] v. Republic of China. . ..
While the Court
did not deal with the act of state doctrine, the basic premise of the case-that
a sovereign entering court as plaintiff opens itself to counterclaims, up to the
amount of the original claim, which could be brought against it by that defendant were the sovereign an ordinary plaintiff-is applicable by analogy to
the situation presented in the present case ...
The Department of State believes that the act of state doctrine should not
be applied to bar consideration of a defendant's counterclaim or set-off against
the Government of Cuba in this or like cases.
For the complete letter, see the Appendix to the second court of appeal's decision, 442
F.2d at 536.
11. 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
12. Certiorari has again been granted, 40 L.W. 3141, (Oct. 12, 1971) to consider
two questions:
(1)
After U.S. Supreme Court has vacated U.S. court of appeals' judgment
and remanded case to court of appeals for reconsideration in light of views expressed by State Department, may court of appeals reinstate its judgment in disregard of those views? (2) May federal court decline, on basis of act of state
doctrine, to permit United States national, as defendant, to offset against claim
of foreign government plaintiff its claim for compensation for property confiscated by that foreign government, even though State Department has made
finding that United States' foreign policy interests do not require application
of doctrine and has expressed view that doctrine should not be applied?
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doctrine, the judicial exception announced in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc.,'3 and the legislative exception created
by the Hickenlooper Amendment are now all intertwined in Banco
4
Nationalde Cuba v. FirstNational City Bank of New York.1
Although its effect is clear-to prohibit United States courts from
looking into the validity of acts of a foreign government within its own
territory-there are a variety of opinions about what the act of state
doctrine is and what it is designed to do. Some view it as a doctrine of
judicial self restraint, others a rule of federal law, others a rule of international law, and still others a principle very similar to those embodied by doctrines of conflicts of laws with the added characteristic
of not being influenced by the public policy of the forum. It is in part
based on the separation of powers, being designed to reserve questions
of foreign relations for decision by the political branches of government
rather than by the courts. In this context, its use prevents embarrassment to the Executive in the conduct of foreign relations. It is also
based on the conflict of laws principle that the law of the place of the
transaction governs, primarily because the courts of this country are too
remote from the act done by the foreign state to be able to validly judge
it. A final basis of the doctrine is to promote reciprocity, international
comity and respect for the sovereignity of the foreign power.
In Underhill v. Hernandez" the Court said:
Each sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. The redress of grievances by reason of such acts
must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 6
In this case and others following it, the Court expressed the opinion that
the aggrieved party would have to seek redress through the aid of his
own government.
The act of state doctrine is closely related to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. That doctrine looks principally at who is protected, the
sovereign-while the act of state doctrine looks at what is protected,
the acts of the sovereign. Only the sovereign itself can claim the privilege of sovereign immunity, whereas anyone, including the sovereign
acting in reliance upon the act of a foreign state, is entitled to claim the
protection of the act of state doctrine.
13.
14.
15.
16.

210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
168 U.S. 250 (1897).
Id. at 252.
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The act of state doctrine has been employed by United States courts
in a variety of situations, and although it has changed through the years
it has never been abrogated. One of the earliest cases decided in the
United States on the principle embodied in the act of state doctrine was
Underhill v. Hernandez.17 There a United States citizen complained of
damages caused by a refusal of Hernandez, a military leader in a Venezuelan revolution, to grant him a passport to leave the city of Bolivar, of
confinement to his home, and of assaults and affronts by Hernandez's
soldiers. Although recognized before the time of the suit, the government Hernandez was acting for was not recognized by the United States
at the time of the act complained of. It was held that the princple involved-not sitting in judgment on the act of another government
within its own territory-was not confined to lawful or recognized
governments."
In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 9 hides belonging to a Mexican
citizen were seized and sold to enforce payment of a military contribution levied by forces of the revolutionary army. As in Underhill, the
revolution succeeded and its leaders were later recognized by the United
States as constituting the lawful government of the country. The Court
held that an action in Mexico, dealing with a Mexican citizen, by a legitimate government was "not subject to reexamination and modification
The act of state doctrine rested on the
by courts of this country."2
comity and expediency,"'21
international
of
considerations
"highest
and a reexamination of the acts of the government of Mexico would
"imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the
peace of nations."22 Therefore Oetjen was left to whatever remedy
he might find in a Mexican Court or through diplomatic means.
Oetjen was a Mexican citizen but in Ricaud v. American Metal Company, Ltd.,21 decided the same day, and arising out of military activities in the same revolution, the plaintiff was an American citizen.
The controversy concerned lead bullion seized and sold by Carranza
forces for war purposes. Concerning the act of state doctrine, the
Court said:
[W]hen it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted
17.

168 U.S. 250 (1897).

18. Id. at 252.
19.

246 U.S. 297 (1918).

20. Id. at 303.
21. Id. at 303-304.
22. Id. at 304.
23. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
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in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of
such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but
must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision.

.

. It

results that the title to the property in this case must be determined
24
by the result taken by the military authorities of Mexico ....
The Court went on to say that the nationality of the complainant was
not controlling.
The fact that the title to the property in controversy may have
been in an American citizen, who was not in or a resident of Mexico at the time it was seized, does not affect the rule of law that the
act within its own boundaries of one sovereign state cannot become the subject of reexamination and modification in the courts
of another. Such action, when shown to have been taken, becomes, as we have said, a rule of decision for the courts of this
25
country.

Some commentators have suggested that these earlier decisions on
the act of state doctrine should not be considered controlling when expropriations by the government of Cuba are at issue.2 6 One such contention is that they did not involve suits between nations and citizens of
other nations. While this was true in Oetjen, it was not true in Ricaud.
Another such contention is that the question of whether there was a violation of international law involved or not was not expressly considered
by the Court. However, in Shapleigh v. Mier,27 the act of state doctrine
was considered in a context in which the petitioners alleged there was a
violation of international law and the Court held that issue irrelevant. The Court said:
The question is not here whether the proceeding was so conducted
as to be a wrong to our nationals under the doctrines of international law, though valid under the law of the situs of the land. For
wrongs of that order the remedy to be followed is along the chan28
nels of diplomacy.
The Shapleigh case was a strong example of the application of the act
of state doctrine because the land was located in the United States at
the time of suit because of a change in the course of the Rio Grande
River.29
The latest Supreme Court case on the subject of the act of state doc24. Id. at 309.
25. Id. at 310.
26. See Michael Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. OF INT'L LAW
826 (1959).
27. 299 U.S. 468 (1937).
28. Id. at 471.
29. As far as diplomatic remedies are concerned, indemnity was provided under
Mexican law in the form of State bonds, but the United States and Mexico had been
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trine was Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino.30 That case arose over
a load of sugar confiscated by the government of Cuba as it was being
put aboard a ship anchored off a Cuban port. The purchaser was required to sign a new contract promising to pay the Cuban government
instead of the nationalized company. The proceeds from the sale of the
sugar, to be paid under the new contract to an agent of the Cuban government in the United States, were claimed both by the agent who had
handed over bills of lading covering the shipment without receiving payment and the nationalized company. The Court gave a clear exposition of the judicially fixed limits on the doctrine without making an
inflexible or all-encompassing rule. It held that if the confiscation was
the act of an existing government, recognized at the time the suit was
filed and affecting property within its own territory, the courts of this
country, absent a treaty or other controlling agreement, would not reexamine it even though it was alleged to be in violation of international
31
law.
The act of state doctrine is not solely a creation of the United States
courts but is also recognized internationally. 3" The English view, maintained up to the present time, is based on the leading case of Luther v.
James Sagor & Co.," concerning the Russian expropriation of the lumber company of a Russian citizen. Lumber sold to the defendant after
expropriation was brought into England and the plaintiff sued for return. In holding that the courts of England could not inquire into the
validity of the Russian expropriation, Lord Justice Bankes wrote:
Even if it was open to the Courts of this country to consider the
morality or justice of the decree of June, 1918, I do not see how
the Courts could treat this particular decree otherwise than as the
expression by the de facto government of a civilized country of a
policy which it considered to be in the best interest of that country.
It must be quite immaterial for the present purposes that the same
views are not entertained by the Government of this country, are
repudiated by the vast majority of its citizens, and are not recognized by our laws.3 4
negotiating payment to United States nationals for their expropriated properties for a
number of years, and although Mexico always promised to pay, its promise was always
for payment in the future, an illusory promise as far as the Hickenlooper Amendment
is concerned. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1962). A reasonable time is defined as "not
more than six months after such action."
30. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
31. Id. at 428.
32. Among others, it has been treated by England and Commonwealth countries,
Japan, Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands. See Reeves, The Sabbatino Case
and the Sabbatino Amendment: Comedy or Tragedy of Errors, 20 VAND. L. REv. 429

(1966), appendix II p. 541, for a complete listing and summarization of foreign cases.
33.
34.
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[1921] 3 K.B. 532.
Id. at 546.
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In coming to its decision the court relied on the views of the United
States Supreme Court expressed in Oetjen. It also rejected the contention that in applying the act of state doctrine it is enforcing the laws
of another country. Holding that the court is not enforcing a contract
in contravention of principles of justice and morality, the court finds
that the appellants are,
[R]esisting an endeavor on the part of respondents to induce the
court to ignore and override legislative and executive acts of the
Government of Russia and its agents affecting title to property in
that country;
it is that which, in my opinion, we are not at liberty
35
to do.

Lord Justice Scrutton spoke to the effects of a decision by the court
on international relations:
But it appears a serious breach of international comity, if a state is
recognized as a sovereign independent state, to postulate that its
legislation
is "contrary to essential principles of justice and mor36
ality."
The Lord Justice listed a number of instances in which English courts
have recognized actions of foreign states contrary to their concepts of
morality. a7
Both American and English courts apply the act of state doctrine
without regard to the citizenship 38 of the complainant and require
only that the act complained of was one of a government recognized at
the time of the suit. The reasons given for this type of application are
varied, but all seem to be based on comity, a feeling of respect for, and
equality of, sovereign states.3 9
The foregoing exposition of cases in which the act of state doctrine
has been applied should not be construed to indicate that there are
no exceptions to the doctrine. The first United States exception arose
35. Id. at 549.
36. Id. at 558-559.
37. Some examples of such recognition given to acts of foreign states considered
contrary to English morality are: enforcing rights derived from a contract for the
sale of slaves, and enforcing payment of gambling debts. Id. at 558.
38. In Re Helbert Wagg Co., Ltd., 1965 All E.R. 129 (Ch).
39. Each sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).

But it appears a serious breach of international comity, if a state is recognized
as a sovereign independent state, to postulate that its legislation is "contrary
to essential principles of justice and morality." Luther v. James Sagor & Co.,
[1921] 3 K.B. 532, 558-559.
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in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc.4" There the
court did not apply the act of state doctrine after the State Department,
in a letter to Bernstein's counsel, had expressed its opinion that it should
not be applied.4 1 The case arose out of the confiscation, by the German government during World War II, of the property of a German
Jew. He subsequently became a United States citizen, and brought suit
against a Dutch shipping company that purchased some of the property
which had been confiscated. Earlier in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres Societe Anonyme42 and Bernstein v. N.V. NederlandscheAmerikaansche, etc., 43 the court had denied the plaintiff recovery on
the grounds that the act of state doctrine barred inquiry into the validity
of the German confiscation. In these earlier cases, the court said:
[T]he only relevant consideration is how far our Executive has
indicated any positive intent to relax the doctrine that our courts
shall not entertain actions of the kind
at bar; some positive evidence
44
of such an intent being necessary.
In the Bernstein cases, the court and the plaintiff, Bernstein, both assumed that the only purpose of the act of state doctrine was complete
deference of the courts to the Executive in the area of foreign affairs.45
The court did not consider the fact that deference to the Executive may
have been only one of the reasons for the use of the act of state doctrine, nor did it consider what the possible purpose of this deference
could be. No argument was made that, because the government which
passed and enforced the act complained of was no longer in existence,
the doctrine did not apply. In other words, it was not contended the
act of state doctrine did not apply because the foreign government whose
46
act was involved was not recognized at the time of the suit.
40. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
41. In part, the letter from the Acting Legal Advisor to the State Department, Jack
B. Tate, read:
This Government has consistently opposed the forcible acts of dispossession
of a discriminatory and confiscatory nature practiced by the Germans on the
countries or peoples subject to their controls ...
The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the United
States for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in lieu
thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the
exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials.
42. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
43. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
44. 163 F.2d at 251.
45. The court felt that the plaintiff's difficulty lay in the fact that "no court will
exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of official acts of another state." The
plaintiff agreed that this was true "but he says that it presupposes that the state of the
forum has not acted to relieve its courts of restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction ......
163 F.2d at 249.
46. A Bernstein type situation was, by the way, provided for in the Court's decision
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The Bernstein exception has proven to be a very narrow one. Until
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of N.Y., a Bernstein
letter had only been issued in the Bernstein case itself. In two other
cases, the parties tried to claim the existence of a Bernstein letter, but in
neither did they succeed. In Sabbatino, the Attorney General in his
amicus brief argued that the correspondence relied upon in the lower
court4 7 was not a Bernstein letter, as the court of appeals had held; and
the Court specifically stated that it was not passing on the Bernstein exception.48 In National Institute of AgrarianReform v. Kane49 the plaintiff sued defendant for conversion of its Cuban property. The plaintiff
tried to rely on the federal court of appeals decision in Sabbatino that
the correspondence to Sabbatino's attorneys constituted a Bernstein
letter, thus relieving the Florida court of the obligation to apply the act
of state doctrine where another Cuban expropriation was involved.
The court refused to accept this argument because the case was distinguishable on its facts." ° The court also found that a telegram"' to the
attorneys in the Kane case only showed that the United States government did not want to express itself one way or the other in the matter.
The second exception to the act of state doctrine in United States
law is found in the Hickenlooper Amendment, 2 passed after the Court's
in Sabbatino ". . . a foreign government, extant and recognized by this country at
the time of the suit...."
376 U.S. at 428.
47. In a letter to counsel for the amici dated October 18, 1961, the Legal Advisor
for the State Department said:
Whether or not these nationalizations will in the future be given effect in
the United States is, of course, for the courts to determine. Since the Sabbatino case and other similar cases are at present before the courts, any comments on this question by the Department of State would be out of place at
this time. As you yourself found out, statements by the executive branch are
highly susceptible of misconstruction.
A letter from the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, dated November
14, 1961, stated:
I have carefully considered your letter and have discussed it with the Legal
Advisor. Our conclusion, in which the Secretary concurs, is that the Department should not comment on matters pending before the courts.
Quoted from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. "This Court has never had occasion to pass upon the so-called Bernstein exception, nor need it do so now." 376 U.S. at 420.
49. 153 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1963).
50. In the case before us, American nationals seek to enforce a claim of conversion in Cuba because of the alleged invalidity of a decree of the Cuban
government. There is a recognizable difference between the refusal to enforce a foreign law which is repugnant to the public policy of the forum . . .
and refusing to pass on the validity under the law of a foreign state of the acts
of its officials. 153 So. 2d 40, 43-44 (Fla. App. 1963).
51. The telegram from the State Department dated April 13, 1961, reads:
Effect in U.S. of decrees, etc. of Castro regime is question for court in which
case heard. 153 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. App. 1963).
52. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964): Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act
of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 3: 184

decision in Sabbatino, and applicable where the act is in violation of internatonal law. The Amendment was held to be controlling in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,5 the final decision rendered in the Sabbatino series of cases. There the court held that the Amendment applied
to the Sabbatino case itself and saw no reason to alter its former judgment that the confiscation involved was in violation of international law.
Since the President did not inform the court that foreign policy interests
required the application of the act of state doctrine, the court found in
favor of the defendants. In effect, the Hickenlooper Amendment reverses the burden imposed by the Bernstein exception. Whereas Bernstein requires that the Executive speak to relieve the courts of the obligation of applying the act of state doctrine, the Hickenlooper Amendment requires the Executive to speak in order that the doctrine be applied if it has once been determined that the act was in violation of international law.
Like the Bernstein exception, the Hickenlooper Amendment has not
been passed on by the Supreme Court. However, in F. Palacioy Compania, S.A. v. Brush54 and French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba5" it was
held that the Hickenlooper Amendment did not apply. The Palacio
case concerned a suit by Cuban citizen owners of a number of cigar
companies against the interventors appointed by the Castro government
for the proceeds of cigars sold in the United States. The Hickenlooper
Amendment was not applicable because it is a settled principle of law
that an act of state against a national of the acting country is not in
violation of international law. 56
In French, the issue concerned a Cuban currency regulation preventing investors from receiving anything but Cuban pesos for their investments in Cuba. When French's assignor had made his investment in
Cuba, a law permitted him to exchange pesos for foreign currency and
take it out of Cuba exempt from taxes. The court held that the change
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right
to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or party claiming
through such state) based on (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles
of international law, including the principles of compensation and the other
standards set out in this subsection: Provided, that this subparagraph shall not
be applicable . . . or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interest of the United States and a suggestion
to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
53. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
54. 256 F. Supp. 481 (1966).
55. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
56. 256 F. Supp. at 487.
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in contract rights did not reach the level of an outright taking or confiscation and was not violative of international law. The Hickenlooper
Amendment was found to be inapplicable to this kind of situation and
in strong limiting language the court said:
Congress was not attempting to assure a remedy in American courts
for every kind of monetary loss resulting from actions, even unjust
actions, of foreign governments. The law is restricted, manifestly,
to the kind of problem exemplified by the Sabbatino case itself, a
claim of title or other
right to specific property which had been
57
expropriated abroad.
The court went on to say that it seemed plain that the Amendment only
came into play "where there has been a confiscation of the very property
58
to which a claim . . . is asserted.
Continuing in the same vein, Judge Lumbard, in the first court of
appeals decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City
Bank of N.Y., 5 9 held that the district court's reading of the Hickenlooper Amendment was too broad and that the Supreme Court decision
in Sabbatino, rather than the Hickenlooper Amendment, was controlling. The decision quoted and relied upon statements made during
the Congressional debates concerning passage of the Amendment.6"
The court held:
Given all of this background, we can find no basis for holding that
the present case is one "in which a claim of title or other right to
property is asserted by (First National City). . . .based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or taking ... " To do so would
stand the statute on end. 61
If the court's view of the case is upheld, the Hickenlooper Amend57. 23 N.Y.2d at 57-58, 242 N.E.2d at 712, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 444-445 (1968).
58. Id. at 58, n.9.
59. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
60. Id. at 400-402. Among the material quoted by the court is the following:
(The amendment) will discourage foreign expropriation by making sure that
the United States cannot become a "thieves' market" for the product of foreign expropriation.
It insures that however the case may arise or the act of state doctrine be invoked, a party who had suffered an expropriation in violation (of international
law) may bring suit to assert his claim to the expropriated property if there is
an attempt to market it in the United States ....
Mr. Olmstead: ... Our amendment has no provision in its scope to apply
to property other than that actually expropriated by the foreign country itself.
Mr. Fraser: You are saying it would be limited solely to situations where
you actually-where what (was) at issue was the title of the (expropriated)
property, that is the major issue?
Mr. Olstead: Yes.
The court also quoted Attorney General Katzenbach's statement:
We are talking about a very isolated, infrequent occurrence which is when
American property that has been nationalized in some way or another finds its
way back in the United States.
61. Id. at 402.
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ment only applies where the very property confiscated or traceable proceeds of it are at issue. If so, it has essentially been construed out of
62
existence in so far as property expropriated by Cuba is concerned,
and it is likely that the Executive would intervene and request the
application of the act of state doctrine if it were striving to maintain
diplomatic relations with the country involved.
Both the Hickenlooper Amendment and a British Empire decision of
the Supreme Court of Aden exemplify the international law exception
to the act of state doctrine. In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate,63
the court returned a cargo of oil expropriated by the Iranian government to the original owner because the expropriation law was contrary
to the public policy of the forum and in violation of international law.64
Oppenheim's InternationalLaw says that an official act of a foreign
state within its own territory is not subject to court review unless it is in
violation of international law.6 5 But Oppenheim's is based perhaps on
things as they should be and not as they are. Also the very nature of a
"rule" of international law prevents it from being able to take into account varying national systems of government. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First National City Bank of N.Y. 6 has arisen out of this
national and international background and presents to the United States
the question of what the act of state doctrine is going to accomplish in
our own particular governmental setting.
The act of state doctrine, the Bernstein exception and the Hickenlooper
Amendment evidence the tug and pull of the three branches of government when questions of United States law, politics, and policy touch on
the official acts of another sovereign state. In this struggle there appear
a variety of opinions on what it is we are doing by our use of the act of
state doctrine. The decision made by the Supreme Court in Banco
62. All trade between the United States and Cuba was stopped in 1963.
63.
1 W.L.R. 246 (Sup. Ct. Aden, 1953) also referred to as the Rose Mary case.
64. For an informative discussion on expropriation see Hoskins, How to Counter
Expropriation,48 HAv. Bus. REv. 102 (1970). TIME MAGAZINE, Oct. 11, 1971, at 97,
provides a view of things to come in its article entitled Chile: The Big Grab.
65. No provision for compensation was made and the contract the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company had been operating under contained a clause to the effect that it could
not be terminated by an act of the Iranian government. The concession was to run
from 1933 to 1991. Oil expropriated from the same company was also the subject of
law suits in Japan, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabuski Kaisha, 1953
Int'l L. Rep. 305, aff'd High Ct., Tokyo, 1953 Int'l L. Rep. 312 (Japan) and Italy,
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Civ. Trib. Venice, March 11, 1953, 78 II
Foro Italiano I. 719 (1955) Int'l L. Rep. 19 (It. 1953) and Civ. Ct., Rome, Sept. 13,
1954, (1955) II Foro Italiano I, 256 (1955) Int'l L. Rep. 23 (It.). In both these cases
the courts upheld the validity of the expropriation and found no violation of international law.
66. 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of N.Y. will turn on the
Court's view of the function of the act of state doctrine.
Is it a rule of international law, to be used to further the development of that law? And if so, how can that development best be furthered, by deciding, or refraining from looking into, questions in which
there is a diversity of national views? And what, if any, obligations do
our courts have to the development of international law?
Is it a rule of national law? Ifso, what are the reasons behind it? If
its purpose is to reserve political questions for those branches of government better suited to deal with them, and to avoid embarrassing the
Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, what effect should the
Hickenlooper Amendment and Bernstein exception be given? Should
the Amendment be broadly or narrowly interpreted? Might its use
tend to embarrass the Executive? Should a Bernstein letter be binding
on the courts-should the courts be required to disgard the act of state
doctrine if a letter is received from the Executive to the effect that it
"need not be applied?"" 7 If so, do we have an independent judiciary?
Can, or should, the use of the act of state doctrine by United States
courts be fashioned to serve both national and international considerations?
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of N.Y.6 8
the courts have dealt with the act of state doctrine, the Hickenlooper
Amendment and the Bernstein exception. The first decision rendered
in the case was based on the Hickenlooper Amendment. The district
court stated that the ultimate issue was whether the confiscation was
violative of international law; 69 since it was, because it was retaliatory,
discriminatory, and failed to provide adequate compensation, the Hickenlooper Amendment was applicable and the court found in favor of
First National City. On appeal, the decision was reversed because the
reading given by the district court to the Hickenlooper Amendment was
too broad.70 The second decision rendered by the court of appeals
67.

A fourth consequence of equality-or independence of States is that the

courts of one State do not, as a rule, question the validity or legality of the official acts of another Sovereign State or the official or officially avowed acts of
its agents, at any rate in so far as those acts proport to take effect within the
sphere of the latter State's own jurisdiction, and are not in themselves contrary
to International Law. LAUTERPRACHT, 8th Ed. 1955, Vol. I, PEACE, at 267.
For two differing views see Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 175 (1967) and Michael Zander, The
Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. OF INT'L LAW 826 (1959).
68. 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
69. 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-1008 (1967).
70. 431 F.2d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 1970).
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came after receipt by the Supreme Court of the "Bernstein" letter from
the State Department. 71 The court reinstated its previous decision holding that the letter was advisory rather than mandatory. 72 The granting of certiorari gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to make a
definative pronouncement on the nature and extent of the act of state
doctrine within our judicial system.
The act of state doctrine can best serve the United States courts and
our system of government, based as it is on a separation of powers, if
the Hickenlooper Amendment is construed narrowly as was done by
Judge Lumbard in the first First National City Bank 7 3 decision by the
court of appeals, a Bernstein type letter is viewed as advisory rather
than mandatory, and the pronouncement of the Court in the Sabbatino
case concerning the scope of the act of state doctrine is reaffirmed. The
United States courts can move towards more active participation in the
development of principles of international law if the Court in this case
reaffirms its right not to apply the act of state doctrine where it considers that a decision by it will not adversely affect the workings of the
political branches of government and will forward the progress of international law. It could suggest a willingness to accept a statement from
the Department of State of its conception of cases falling within this
general category, and agree to consider the State Department's recommendation in any particular case that the act of state doctrine be applied to foreclose inquiry into the validity of a foreign act of state
for overriding reasons of foreign policy.
By doing this it is possible that we are, to some extent, abrogating our
responsibility in the area of development of international law. But a
willingness of United States courts to look into some types of actions
by foreign states will better serve the development of international law
than refusing to get involved with any of these questions or allowing
a decision to be completely dominated by the political branches of our
government." In the interests of foreign policy, the courts cannot function completely without regard for the views of the executive and legislative branches of government. But however, they can not provide ab71.
72.
73.

Supra note 10.
442 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1971).
See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE

NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER,

OF THE DOMESTIC COURTS IN

THE INTER-

(1964), for an excellent exposition on how the act of state

doctrine can be employed by the United States courts to strengthen and assist in
the development of international law.
74. See 12 HARV. INT'L LAw J. 577 (1971), and I1 VA. J. OF INT'L LAw 406,
(1971) for a view on the difficulties arising from treating the receipt of a Bernstein
type letter as a mandate to the court to disregard the act of state doctrine.
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solute unanimity of decision while implementing the other principles of
international law, but not the act of state doctrine.
But, as Falk states in his book, The Role of the Domestic Courts in
the International Legal Order,7" some principles of international law
are more settled than the requirement for compensation in the case of
expropriations of property of aliens. Principles based on a consensus
in the area of universal human rights such as the illegality of discriminatory and retaliatory takings are generally conceded to be in violation
of international law. Our courts can serve international law and uphold
the rights of our citizens in these more settled areas of international
law and still heed the wishes of the Excecutive where there are overriding considerations of foreign policy. Judge Waterford in the court
of appeals decision in the Sabbatino case"" devotes much time to the
discriminatory and retaliatory aspects of Cuban Law 851 which formed
the basis for the confiscation in Sabbatino and in the First National City
Bank case. But he then based his decision in the case on the fact that
compensation was not provided. The need for compensation is a much
less universal principle of international law than the need to apply laws
in an even-handed, rather than a discriminatory or retaliatory manner.
By taking these more universally accepted principles and upholding
them in decisions of our domestic courts, we can contribute to the development of international law, since it is an essentially horizontal rather than vertical system of law resting on similar decisions rendered by
many co-equal national court systems.
The United States courts can speak out with a powerful voice and
have much influence on the development of international law. It is true
that their decisions may occasionally be politicized and lose strength
because the Executive retains a veto on the court's ability to decide an
issue on the basis of more or less universally recognized principles of
international law. But there may be overriding political considerations
that dictate against the upholding of these international principles in
specific situations. Since the conduct of foreign relations is entrusted to
the Executive, the interest of harmony among the branches of government requires international law considerations to give way in these instances.
But although the courts cannot free themselves entirely from the considerations of the Executive, neither should they become completely de75.
76.

Supra note 73.
307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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pendent on it to either decide (Bernstein exception) or not decide
(Hickenlooper Amendment) questions concerning an act of a
foreign state. Our governmental system is one of checks and balances
and such an attitude would serve neither international law nor the independence of the judiciary. For that reason the courts should, with
the advice of the Executive, set out general categories for action, reserving for themselves the determination in each specific case, subject only
to the right of the Executive to request that the act of state doctrine
be applied. This is essential to a preservation of judicial independence.
The courts cannot act in complete disregard for Executive prerogatives
in the area of foreign policy, but neither should they be called upon to
implement political decisions.
By always applying the act of state doctrine, no matter how clearly a
violation of settled principles of international law can be discerned our
courts are abrogating their duty to the furtherance of international law.
By making their action always dependent on a policy statement by the
Executive they are not only abrogating their international law function by
allowing their course of action to depend on an ad hoc decision by the
Executive, but also undermining the constitutionally based structure of
separation of powers, and abandoning judicial independence. By setting out categories of actions in advance in which the courts can feel
free to proceed and apply or not apply the act of state doctrine subject
only to the reservation of power by the Executive to intervene to request
the application of the act of state doctrine where policy considerations
demand that the validity of an act of a foreign power not be scrutinized,
the courts can best advance the development of international law and at
the same time maintain their proper relationship with the Executive.
This type of system has been used in connection with the doctrine of
77
sovereign immunity with only occasional difficulties.
Aside from redress in United States courts for loss resulting from acts
of foreign states, what else can be done to protect the American investor
abroad and promote the further development of international law?
More of an effort might be made to use the international courts and
conciliatory facilities. The 1966 World Bank Convention of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States78 made provi77. But see II CHAYES, EHRLICH, AND LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS,
(1968), for an idea of the problems that may arise from this kind of approach as exemplified by the Bahia de Nipe case. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th
Cir. 1961).
78. TIAS 6090, entered into force Oct. 14, 1966.
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sion for binding arbitration by an international tribunal of disputes involving one country and nationals of another if such is agreed to in a
prior contract made between the government and the individual. Later,
even if one of the parties refuses to attend the arbitration sessions a binding award can be made. And if the Connelly Amendment,7 9 which reserves the right for the United States to decide which matters before the
International Court of Justice are within domestic jurisdiction and
therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court and
necessarily extends this right to countries we wish to proceed against,
were repealed, the number of instances in which the United States government could espouse the grievances of its citizens before the International Court of Justice would be expanded.
Before difficulties arise, bilateral and multilateral treaties could be
negotiated which would more clearly set our the rights and obligations of
parties to a contract between one country and nationals of another, thus
providing a clear base for decision for both domestic and international
courts. After a dispute has arisen, remedies available through diplomatic negotiations can be more vigorously pursued. Although the mere
fact that the Department of State has entered into negotiations with a
foreign country concerning property expropriated from United States
citizens does not mean that recovery of damages will be possible, the
Executive has a strong bargaining point in the first Hickenlooper
Amendment."0 That Amendment provides that foreign aid can be cut
off to those countries which expropriate American owned property without adequate compensation. Finally, the government does make insurance available to companies doing business abroad through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
There is no way in which the United States investor abroad can be
guaranteed that his investment will be completely safe, either by taking
all of the abovementioned steps, or by complete abrogation of the act
of state doctrine. The doctrine performs a variety of functions and it
can be made to perform them more efficiently for all concerned, including the investor abroad, if the decision concerning its use is left
securely in the hands of the Court.
DIANE C. LOTKO

79. 61 Stat. 1218, Para. 2, CI. b., Aug. 14, 1946; TIAS 1598.
80. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1962). This law, in effect since 1962, has never been
used by the President.

